作者 ｜
吳秀瑾(中正大學哲學系)
摘要 ｜
本文將以Eva Feder Kittay（1999）《論愛的勞動》一書為主軸，首先彙整出 Kittay 依靠批判的主要思想脈絡與論點，包括：根據Martha Fineman（1995）所提出的母子依靠關係（mother/child dependency relation）呈現各種家庭組成的可能型態；根據Robert E. Goodin（1985）的易受傷害模型（vulnerability model）立論關懷倫理的道德基礎；採用Amartya Sen（1992）的能力取向（capabilityapproach）立論照顧的分配正義；進而彙整出依靠批判（the dependencycritique），檢討法政與道德理論中所預設的獨立性嚴重地忽略了依靠之生命處境與照顧主體之道德地位。
此外，本文將進一步延伸討論女性主義對依靠的關懷倫理之評價，其中Kittay 和Marta Nussbaum 對關懷與正義的微妙對比，值得討論。Nussbaum 強調獨立與自願的關懷；相對的，Kittay 強調（互相）依靠的生命處境與對依靠者的特殊道德義務。此外，雖然兩人都主張能力平等的照顧正義立場，但是Nussbaum 強調每個個人是能力平等分配的基本單位； Kittay 則主張照顧者與依靠者間互相調整、彼此妥協的交錯能力平等（nested dependencies）。是Kittay 的依靠批判學說比較周延？還是Nussbaum 自由主義下的關懷？兩種照顧正義理論是否有著蘊涵關係？
本文的結論是： Kittay 的依靠關懷與照顧正義更能呼應女性向來重視從關係中自我定位的人格特質。依靠的關懷倫理強調依靠的優先性與其道德地位的正當性，因為照顧者在非自願的選擇下，仍然適時地回應他人急迫的需求，反映了關懷的美德與道德人格的成熟與完整。同時，社會應該讓照顧者得到充分的支援與調養，使其發揮關懷美德，保護易受傷害的依靠者。
關鍵字 ｜
關懷倫理、易受傷害模型、照顧的正義、依靠批判、能力取向
Title ｜
Dependency and Equality: On Kittay’s Love’s Labor
Author ｜
Shiu-Ching Wu(Department of Philosophy National Chung Cheng Univiersity)
Abstract ｜
The publication of Eva Feder Kittay’s Love’s Labor in 1999 was a significant event in the development of care ethics (CE). The moral insights stemming from Kittay’s theorizing based on her own experience of caring for her severely retarded 30-years-old daughter, Sesha, are not only emotionally touching, but also morally inspiring. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze the theories that have contributed to the emergence of Kittay’s dependency critique, including Martha Fineman’s (1995) model of mother/child dependency relation which illustrates what possible models of attitudes become formed among family members; Robert E. Goodin’s (1985) vulnerability model which we apply in our discussion of the theory’s moral foundations; Amartya Sen’s (1992) capability approach which assesses the level of fairness in allocation of care; and finally Martha C. Nussbaum’s (1999) seminal work Sex and social justice. Second, we examine the implications of the dependency critique, such as the impact of care’s de-gendering, the moral grounds of CE, and feminist scholars’ critical assessments of the dependency-oriented care. This study pays a special attention to the contrast between Nussbaum’s concept of universalistic independence and Kittay’s notion of connectionbased equality, and suggests in what ways, according to the dependency critique, social values should be adjusted. Finally, we conclude that CE, as a general moral theory, finds its moral grounds in the principle of vulnerability. Given the fact that dependency relations are inevitable human conditions, namely, that we all need to be cared for when sick or old, and that we must respond to the needs of others when they require our care, care should be viewed as an inseparable component of everyone’s conception of moral goodness. Thus, care becomes the primary condition in the pursuit of one’s happiness; and a just society should provide care to any one of its members in need.
Last but not least, Kittay’s dependency critique which strongly criticizes all legal, moral, and social values attached to the superiority of independence and individual’s autonomy, should relieve the negative effects of the personal conflict that many care-providers, who often tend to put their (economic) independence at a great risk, tend to face when choosing care for others over their own independence.
Keywords ｜
dependency critique, vulnerability model, care ethics, capability approach